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Abstract 
 
We evidence a non-linear relationship between firm value and corporate social responsibility, 
adding to the mixed evidence on this relationship. We show that corporate social responsibility 
exhibits a dynamic process, which is largely dependent on a firm’s industry, relative standing 
amongst peers and the distinction between responsible and irresponsible behavior. Surprisingly, 
we find that responsible behavior could sometimes destroy firm value, while irresponsible 
behavior could sometimes increase firm value. Endogeneity is mitigated through a novel process 
that allows us to keep constant the endogeneity inherent in this field, examining corporate social 
responsibility’s effect on firm value separately. 
 
Key words: Corporate Social Responsibility, stakeholder, peer, CSR, ESG, perception, firm value 
JEL Classification: G32, G34, M14  
                                                 
1
 School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Albany Highway, Albany, 0632, New Zealand, +64-9-
414-0800. Email: d.ding@massey.ac.nz ; c.s.ferreira@massey.ac.nz ; j.wongchoti@massey.ac.nz  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1971484
2 
 
Introduction 
The application of societal responsibility to corporations has been extensively examined starting 
with Bowen’s (1953) Social Responsibility’ of the Businessman, followed by Friedman’s (1970) 
seminal work to more contemporary notions of corporate sustainability (van Marrewijk, 2003) 
and corporate citizenship (Logsdon & Wood, 2002). Most finance studies focus on particular 
aspects of corporate social responsibility (CSR); more often-environmental responsibility and 
illegal behavior are the main areas of concern (Statman & Glushkov, 2009). Most of the early 
work centered on irresponsible behavior or aggregated responsible and irresponsible behavior
2
. 
Recent work has a greater focus on CSR from a community or employee perspective
3
. 
Evidence of CSR’s benefits are presented as mixed in the literature, albeit more positive than 
not
4
. It is shown that good corporate governance and adhering to environmental laws tend to 
benefit firms
5
. However activities with a societal focus or environmental actions beyond what is 
legally required tend to show conflicting results (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Chatterji 
et al., 2009). Clearly certain activities provide more value to a company than others and there is a 
good chance the stakeholders the firm engages affects the value of these activities and vice 
versa
6
. 
Related research in management, ethics and psychology documents  that the benefits of positive 
behavior is strongly correlated with the notion of observation, with less dependence on intrinsic 
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fulfillment
7
. Drawing on this knowledge one can assume that this behavior might manifest itself 
within the economic world. Simple good deeds undertaken by commercial entities might have 
less to do with the benefits provided to the recipient and more to do with the benefits provided to 
the giver
8
.  An understanding has grown that corporate social responsible behavior (doing the 
right thing) and corporate social irresponsible behavior (doing the wrong thing) are not perfect 
opposites (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011). It is the intent of this paper to distinguish between 
responsible and irresponsible corporate behavior. Furthermore, previous work has established 
that different industries are affected by CSR in different ways (Fernández-Kranz & Santaló, 
2010), we find similar results. Most surprising are the completely different relationships or lack 
thereof exhibited between industries that we find. Using proprietary data from Kinder, Lydenberg 
and Domini (KLD) we show that engaging in Strength activities (responsible behavior) and 
Concern activities (irresponsible behavior) exhibit different relationships with firm value, and 
that an aggregate measure of the two needs caution when interpreting. Interestingly our results 
suggest that engaging in some irresponsible behavior is beneficial to firm value. We also 
evidence that engaging in responsible behavior has little effect on value and could perhaps 
destroy value, but must note that firms with the high levels of responsible behavior receive a 
value boost in some industries. This relationship is not robust to all industries and seems mainly 
driven by industries heavily dependent on physical inputs, labor and stakeholder management, 
like manufacturing and the service industry. 
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Hypotheses  
CSR has been perceived as a proxy for good management (Galbreath, 2010), an element that is 
mispriced and undervalued by the market (Renneboog et al., 2008b), a form of diversification to 
aid competition (Fernández-Kranz & Santaló, 2010) or a function used to sate stakeholders and 
legitimize the firm (Carroll & Shabana, 2010). The evidence on CSR’s effect on firms’ 
performance and value is mixed, and it is believed that stakeholders, or at least a certain sub-
group, may have a multi-attribute utility function that is not only based on the standard risk-
reward optimization but also incorporates a set of personal and societal values (Bollen, 2007), 
which may attribute to previous confounding results. Firms that undertake CSR should either 
have increased returns (Orlitzky et al., 2003) or have a lower cost of equity (Becchetti & Ciciretti, 
2006). The evidence on this relationship is mixed (Bassen et al., 2006; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001a). We believe that much of the disparity of findings is attributable to the aggregation of 
CSR measures.  As responsible and irresponsible behavior are not necessarily perfect opposites 
nor equally weighted, summing the difference could make inferences noisy. There is a difference 
between avoiding negative behavior and engaging in positive behavior (Chatterji et al., 2009; 
Gillan et al., 2010).  
Benabou and Tirole (2010) fail to present a strong link between CSR and profitability. 
They find that most CSR is associated with large profitable firms who produce final goods, this is 
contrasted with (Gillan et al., 2010) who do find a significant link between firm value, 
performance and CSR. However several studies
9
 lament the aggregation of CSR across 
categories, across industries and between responsible and irresponsible behavior. We take a 
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closer look into this relationship by examining the differences between responsibility and 
irresponsibility, within industry and between categories. 
H1.A 
A firm’s level of CSR is positively related to firm value and performance 
A major stammering point, in the drive to understand CSR, is whether CSR is motivated by: a 
profit motive; pressure from shareholders, stakeholders; management; or a combination of the 
above. The value of engaging in CSR for a firm might be less reliant on what the firms actually 
does and more dependent on what it is perceived to do
10
. It is shown that people act differently 
depending on whether their actions are known and monitored and we believe that this human 
characteristic would drive the implementation of CSR.  Public knowledge increases philanthropic 
behavior (Fernández-Kranz & Santaló, 2010), and people tend to perceive things in relative terms 
and not in absolute terms (Benabou & Tirole, 2010). This would imply that it is not the absolute 
level of CSR that determines how the environment responds to a firm but rather the level of a 
firm’s CSR relative to other firms.  
Statman and Glushkov (2009) show that adopting a best-in-class approach when forming 
portfolios on CSR leads to significant returns over strategies which focus on looking at the 
overall best. They adjust their CSR scores by industry mean and show that superior CSR 
performance relative to peers is related to increased returns. As an extension society should 
mirror this effect by valuing CSR in relative terms. It should hold that as firms increase 
(decrease) their level of CSR beyond the peer average, the effect of CSR on the firm would 
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become visible. Thus the confounding evidence on CSR might be due to a misspecification, as it 
is not the absolute level of CSR that drives financial characteristics, but a relative one. As a 
firm’s CSR activities increase relative to their peers, stakeholders and shareholders should find it 
easier to differentiate the firm along a CSR continuum and respond appropriately. As such the 
benefit of CSR might not be a tangible internal creation but might flow through from stakeholder 
interaction and shareholder financing. These two entities might only forward the associated 
benefits of CSR once a firm’s relative CSR performance is at a certain level. 
H1.B 
A firm’s relative standing amongst its peers, in terms of CSR, is positively related to firm value 
and performance 
To engage in CSR an initial investment is required, but the benefits of CSR might not accrue 
instantly and linearly in accordance with CSR expenditure. It is likely that firms would operate 
their CSR activities at a loss for some period before the benefit of CSR accrues to a point where 
CSR has a net beneficial effect on the firm. This is in accordance with much of the SRI literature 
which indicates that SRI funds have screening criteria which limit their ability to invest. As an 
example, if most of the market value of CSR is related to investment from SRI funds, then these 
benefits would only manifest once the firm has an appropriate level of CSR investment to qualify 
for SRI investment. The lag between a change in the fundamental characteristics of stocks and 
certain stakeholders’ reaction can be extended from credit ratings research. It is well established, 
(Altman & Rijken, (2004), that a changes in the default risk of firms need to be significant 
enough and extend for long enough periods before ratings agencies would adjust a firm’s rating. 
This implies that firms would have to incur the constraints of reducing default risk for a period 
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while it would not capture the benefit of a lower rating. Similarly Macro-Economists have 
studied the notion of thresholds at a national scale and found that a country’s financial 
development would need to surpass a certain threshold before economic development would take 
place, conversely if economies pass certain inflation thresholds economic growth is shunted 
(Rousseau & Wachtel, 2002). Firm level thresholds do exist, like operating capital, and can 
impose significant costs associated with the process of passing through the threshold (Aghion, 
Fally, & Scarpetta, 2007). 
H2 
CSR investment will only provide positive financial benefits after a sufficient level of CSR 
investment is made. 
Data and Methodology 
Source description 
This study is principally based on the Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) ratings 
developed by Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD). KLD is a proprietary database which rates 
some securities on the Russell 3000, according to various measures, since 1991. The ratings fall 
within 7 categories relating to Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee 
Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product. KLD also provides exclusionary screening 
criteria on securities with notable involvement with Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, 
Nuclear Power and Tobacco. Each category has several sub-categories representing possible 
Strengths or responsible behavior (positive points) and Concerns or negative behavior (negative 
points). KLD analysts rate firms on their various CSR characteristics annually by assigning a 
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binary point to several sub-categories within each aforementioned category. It is important to 
note that Strengths and Concerns within each category are not perfect opposites, nor are there 
equal amounts of possible Strengths and Concerns within each category or across categories. We 
exclude stocks (unless stated) that have been marked as controversial as well as stocks that were 
examined by KLD but failed to score. For a detail understanding please turn to the appendix for a 
copy of the KLD criteria. 
KLD has been extensively covered in literature being the basis of many studies relating to CSR
11
 
. The most popular aggregation method amongst these studies takes the sum of Strengths net of 
Concerns for each category as per equation 1 and aggregates this into an overall score as per 
equation (2). 
    
   ∑         
  ∑         
  
  
 
    
  
 
       (1) 
 
     ∑      
  
        (2) 
Where     
 
 is the aggregated ESG score for category j, year t. Similarly         
 
 is the 
Strength indicator, equal to 1 if the firm meets Strength s in category j, otherwise 0;         
 
 is 
the Concern indicator, equal to 1 if the firm meets Concern r in category j, otherwise 0. 
As KLD data is binary with a heterogeneous amount of Concern and Strength criteria allocated 
across various subcategories, it could be misleading to simply look at firm’s ultimate score. 
Firstly the result of the ‘netting off’ process would obscure information as Concerns and 
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Strengths are not perfect opposites.  Netting-off, erroneously assumes all binary points are equal 
and opposite. Secondly as the number of possible points vary not only across Concerns and 
Strengths but over subcategories as well, it becomes difficult to interpret the meaning of a whole 
number. In this study each firm is assigned a percentage of possible points for both Concerns and 
Strengths, referred to as their level of CSR (Manescu, 2011). This allows one to compare a firm’s 
performance across subcategories, between Strength and Concern and between years.  
Example: if a firm a scored 1 out of the possible 4 for the Strength section of the 
Environmental category it would be modified to 0.25. As there where 4 possible points 
available, but only 1 point was awarded. Following, if the firm also scored 2 Concern points 
(in the Environmental category) from a possible 10, a percentage score of 0.2 would be 
awarded. Under the binary system the firm would have a net score of -1 (1 Strength less 2 
Concern), while as a percentage the firm would have a Net-CSR score of 0.05 (0.25 Strength 
less 0.2 Concern).  
Formally the aggregation takes the following form in equation 3, with the overall score in 
equation 4. 
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         (4) 
The KLD data is matched with data from the Centre for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) for 
the period beginning 1991 through 2009. We obtain market capitalization (size), average volume 
(volume), adjusted price (price) and adjusted shares outstanding (shares outstanding) for each 
calendar year end t. Furthermore Income Statement and Balance Sheet items are obtained by 
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matching the CRSP data with Compustat through CRSPlink. Turnover is calculated as the log of 
average monthly volume over shares outstanding at the end of each year t. Return on assets and 
return on equity are calculated as EBIT over total assets, book equity respectively. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as market value of assets over book value of assets, where market value is equal to 
total assets plus market equity less book equity. Debt to asset ratio is the total liabilities over total 
assets. The interest rate is Interest expense to total liabilities. Foreign sales to sales is the level of 
sales made outside of the U.S to total sales received by the firm. Advertising to sales is the 
advertising expense over sales
12
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1.1 shows the number of firms assessed by KLD for each year that can be matched with 
CRSPlink, it is clear that the number of firms assessed increase dramatically over the years. Table 
1.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the CSR sub-categories, while Table 1.3 shows the 
financial characteristics of the firms. 
The average CSR (Net) undertaken by the sample is -0.02, with roughly twice as many 
Concerns for every Strength. The Community category stands out as the only category with a 
positive mean while all the rest are negative, especially Corporate Governance. Diversity has the 
highest average Strength and Concern scores while Humanity has the lowest average strength and 
concern scores. The average size of a firm is nearly $6bn. with a Tobin’s Q of 2 and a market to 
book of 3.5.  
Graph 1 in the appendix illustrates firm distribution along a CSR continuum. As one can see CSR 
is heavily concentrated around 0 indicating many firms either do not engage in CSR or that their 
                                                 
12
 Coded missing values to zero to ensure robust sample size, results are not affected. 
11 
 
responsible behavior is no more than their irresponsible behavior (equal amounts of Strengths 
and Concerns). Furthermore it is quite apparent that firms tend to cluster at certain levels of CSR, 
most notably a significant cluster to the left of the mean.  
Graph 2, in the appendix, shows the distribution of Strength (responsible behavior), nearly 40% 
of firms do not score a single Strength with a notable gap between firms who engage in 
responsible behavior (as indicated by Strength scores) and those that do not. Similarly firms are 
seen clustering at certain levels. Graph 3, in the appendix, turns to Concern, where a similar 
pattern emerges. A quarter of firms do not engage in irresponsible behavior (Concern score of 0).  
A comparable gap is also present along with heavy clustering around certain points. 
Table 1.4 shows the average yearly score of Strength, Concern and CSR (Net), it clearly indicates 
that there is a shift in the data around 2000, where firms suddenly attract half as many Strength 
scores opposed to Concern scores. This change could be a result of the inclusion of more stocks 
as KLD’s sample selection increased. Hamilton and Statman (1993) also find a shift in their data 
over time, however their sample pre-dates ours. Both these results contrast Heinkel et al. (2001) 
who predicted that the growth in SRI would increase participation in CSR. 
Peer Groups: A firm’s relative standing 
Accounting for the method by which stakeholders approximate CSR is important, as the majority 
of CSR’s purported benefits stem from efficiencies or premiums extracted from stakeholders, and 
not necessary from a linear cost-benefit relationship. 
Example: If a firm was to build a crèche for its employees to use, the economic argument 
would suggest that employees would no longer have to pay for their own daycare and take 
as much time off work to tend to children; whilst gaining loyalty from employees. 
12 
 
Although employees might take less time of work many other benefits (employee loyalty, 
willingness to work overtime, staff retention, etc.) might not arise if the employees do not 
feel that they are receiving perquisites greater than what they could receive elsewhere. 
The implication being that if the majority of workspaces provided a crèche employees 
would penalize their employers for a lack of a crèche, but not necessarily provide 
extended benefits as they see it as a staple. Similarly a firm who pioneered the crèche 
might see the value received initially begin to fade as other firms extend the same benefit.  
As stakeholders have a multi-attribute utility function incorporating a set of personal and societal 
values (Bollen, 2007), their decision to and conditions under which they interact with a firm will 
depend upon the firm’s level of CSR. Unfortunately stakeholders have imperfect information 
relating to a firm’s level of CSR (Kempf & Osthoff, 2007; Statman & Glushkov, 2009) and will 
view a firm’s CSR relative to other firms that stakeholders could possibly engage (Benabou & 
Tirole, 2010). It is shown that investment funds employ arbitrary CSR screens based on a 
best/worst in class criteria (Kempf & Osthoff, 2007; Statman & Glushkov, 2009). It is 
conceivable that stakeholders would employ a similar, if not more rudimentary, strategy when 
evaluating a firm’s CSR profile based on their imperfect information, effectively trying to 
distinguish firms as “good” or “bad” from the plethora of average firms. 
Graph 4, in the appendix, illustrates the process around a firm’s perceived level of CSR. One can 
see that for any given point along the CSR continuum stakeholders would approximate the firm’s 
level of CSR with a significant margin of error. It is therefore possible that a unit change in a 
firm’s CSR level might not be observed by stakeholders unless that unit change resulted in the 
firm moving significantly away from a one group of peers into another that the stakeholder has 
13 
 
defined. The implication is thus: Assuming that all firms could only adjust their level of CSR by 
a set unit in a given period, stakeholders only adjust their perception of a firm’s CSR level if the 
resulting change punctured an arbitrary threshold. Stakeholders would only adjust their 
perception of the firm, if the unit change moved the firm into a different category, other firms 
would not be seen to have moved at all, even though all firms moved by the same unit. 
Therefore the most financial value would be extracted or lost by firms whose level of CSR places 
them over the cusp of a threshold. A standard change in the CSR level of these firms would 
dramatically effect their economic environment, as stakeholders adjust their behavior to factor in 
the new CSR loading. 
It is important to note that not all stakeholders extract the same utility from CSR, have the 
same information, or define their CSR thresholds similarly. Secondly although a stakeholder’s 
perception of the firm’s CSR might have changed, an inertia would exist before the stakeholder’s 
behavior towards the firm changes (contractual obligations, barriers to entry, transaction costs 
etc.). It is therefore possible that firms would less likely experience a hard threshold but more 
likely a soft transitional zone, as perception of the firm adjusts. 
For the purpose of this study we define three sets of possible thresholds stakeholders 
could hold. The first threshold set will simply define firms within 5 peer groups based on 
quintiles using the 20
th
, 40
th
, 60
th
 and 80
th
 percentiles, known as peer group 1 through 5 
respectively. The second set assumes that a firm would need to be significantly different from the 
average before it is noticed. This threshold named ‘High’, uses the 10th, 30th , 70th and 90th 
percentiles, known as Peer Group 1 through 5 respectively. Alternatively the “Low” threshold set 
defines Peer Groups using the 10
th
, 40
th
, 60
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles. The assumption here is that 
14 
 
stakeholders notice easily when firms deviate from the average but only readjust their perceptions 
once the firm becomes best in class.  
We must stress that the thresholds used should not be seen as robustness checks around the 
relationship between CSR and value. As stakeholders likely define arbitrary CSR thresholds, we 
employ several models to help us in determine where these thresholds lie. It is conceivable that if 
one bunches two groups of firms that are seen differently by stakeholders into the same peer 
group, then the relationship between CSR and value will change/suffer/or disappear altogether. 
Our assumption in this paper is that the linear relationship between CSR and value is not robust, 
but dependent on a firms relative standing amongst its peers. Therefore insignificant results are 
just as meaningful as significant results in determining where stakeholders define firms along a 
CSR continuum. 
We assume that firms are perceived relative to their industry peers and not the market as a 
whole
13
. To ensure even representative peer groups we calculate peer groups for each industry for 
each year. This mitigates any CSR shift that occurs over time. Lastly we only define peer groups 
for the four largest industries, based on 2-digit SIC codes (Manufacturing, Transport, Finance and 
Service). We require that an industry have at least 30 firms per year for the whole sample, to 
allow us to calculate representative breakpoints
14
. 
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Preliminary Findings 
Table 2, in the appendix reports the regressions’ coefficients for the relationship between firm 
value and CSR.  Specifically we test each of the CSR (Net), Strength and Concern scores 
separately
15. Our proxy for firm value is Tobin’s Q and we control for firm size (log of market 
capitalization), leverage (total liabilities over total assets), advertising (advertising over sales) and 
foreign sales (foreign sales over sales) as well as industry (2-digit SIC code), fixed year effects 
and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Our model incorporates dummies (   ( )   ) to 
account for a firm’s relative standing amongst its peers as perceived by stakeholders. We used the 
“Quintile” threshold to define peer groups as follows: peer group 1: 20th percentile or below, peer 
group 2: 40
th
 percentile and below and above 20
th
 percentile, peer group 3: 60
th
 percentile and 
below and above 40
th
 percentile, peer group 4: 80
th
 percentile and below and above 60
th
 
percentile, peer group 5: above 80
th
 percentile. If a firm falls within one of these peer groups, the 
associated dummy would take the value of 1, otherwise 0.  
The model also includes interaction terms (  (   )    ( )  ) for each of the peer groups to 
indicate the marginal effect of CSR for each peer group. Specifically model (1) is: 
              (   )     ( )     (   )   ( )     (    )     (        )   
  (       )                   (1) 
 
                                                 
15
 We also test with the Strength and Concern scores combined and the results, not reported, are qualitatively similar. 
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Relationship between CSR (Net) and firm value 
Table 1.5 presents the reduced form
16
 results of the relationship between CSR and firm value 
across all threshold specifications. 
The results across the whole sample shown in the first column (Pooled) of results show that only 
the ‘High’ model presented a significantly positive relationship between CSR and firm value, 
eroding the notion that CSR has a robust significantly positive relationship with firm value. 
Counter intuitively both the ‘Quintile’ and ‘High’ models indicate that firms that are perceived as 
irresponsible or ‘Bad’ are inherently more valuable. This would indicate that ‘Bad’ firms are not 
“punished’ by society for irresponsible behavior. Similarly ‘Good’ firms have a significantly 
negative marginal relationship between CSR and firm value across all three models. The results 
would suggest that as a rule of thumb CSR is not associated with increased value, and significant 
investment in CSR is value destroying.  
Turning to the industry panels it becomes clear that the relationship is not homogenous 
across industries, and that some industries are particularly sensitive to CSR. The second column 
shows the results for manufacturing firms. Again, the relationship between CSR and firm value is 
shown for the ‘High’ model, with ‘Bad’ firms being inherently more valuable (‘Quintile’ model 
only). Interestingly ‘Good’ firms are also inherently more valuable (‘Quintile’) but experience a 
negative marginal relationship between further involvement in CSR and value (‘High’ and ‘Low’ 
models). It would seem that the relationship between CSR and value is temperamental for the 
manufacturing industry, with the most robust result indicating too much CSR is value destroying. 
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Column three, showing transport firms, conversely suggest that CSR has a positive relationship 
with value for ‘Good’(‘Low’ model) firms and ‘Bad’ firms (‘Quintile’ and ‘Low”). It would seem 
that firms are able to extract value from CSR if they are perceived as different from the mean or 
‘Average’. The results suggest that engaging in CSR only affects value as firms move from being 
‘Bad’ to ‘Average’ or from ‘Average’ to ‘Good’. It would suggest that Stakeholders with a 
sensitivity towards CSR will asses the CSR profile of firms more closely when they deviate away 
from the mean, while largely ignoring CSR changes in firms considered average. 
Column four, showing the Finance Industry, is marginal at best showing only a positive 
marginal relationship between CSR and firm value for the ‘Quintile’ modelColumn five, showing 
the service industry, has the most robust result (possibly driving the results for the pooled 
regression). CSR exhibits a positive relationship with value; both the ‘Quintile and ‘Low” models 
showing extremely significant results
17
. Interestingly, it would seem that ‘Bad’ firms are 
inherently more valuable (‘High’ model) with a negative marginal relationship between CSR 
value (‘Low’ model). Most importantly, firms seen as ‘Good’ experience an inherent value drop 
(all three models), but also a negative marginal relationship (‘Quintile’ and ‘Low’) between CSR 
and value. The results imply that for ‘Average’ firms CSR adds value to the firm but too much is 
value destroying. Secondly it would seem that a healthy market exists for firms engaging in 
irresponsible behavior  
In sum the results suggest CSR does not have a clear result with firm value, and that 
engaging in too much CSR has a negative impact. The results seem to be concentrated in the 
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Service industry. If the results seem confounding the reader should not that the results presented 
are for CSR (Net) and take the difference between responsible and irresponsible behavior 
(Strengths less Concerns), we argue that this method produces results that are hard to interpret 
and argue that responsible and irresponsible behavior should be evaluated separately, as we will 
do in the following sections. 
Relationship between responsible behavior (Strengths) and firm value 
Turning to Table 1.6, the first column, showing the pooled results, indicates that overall Strength 
is negatively associated with firm value (Quintile and Low models), interestingly firms with high 
levels of Strength experience an inherent value increase (Quintile and Low), but do have a 
negative marginal relationship (Quintile only). 
Turning to the second column, for manufacturing, Strength seems to bear little in terms of 
value. Looking at the third column, showing Transport, the ‘Quintile’ and ‘Low’ models predict 
contrasting results for the relationship between Strength and value, however it does seem that 
‘Average’ firms have a marginally positive relationship with between value and Strength 
(Quintile and High models), but that high levels of Strength reduces value inherently (High and 
Low models) and might inversely affect the marginal relationship (‘Low’ model). 
Column four, showing the results for Finance, indicates that the finance industry is largely 
subject to a negative relationship (Quintile and Low) between responsible behavior and value, but 
firms who are perceived as good are inherently more valuable (all models). This would suggest 
that responsible behavior is more costly than the benefits that are produced, until a firm is 
perceived as ‘Good’ when firm value is positively affected, although the relationship between 
Strength and value would still be negative. This would imply, engaging in Strength only to the 
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point where one sates the definition of being ‘Good’ (if the firm wanted to extract value from 
Stakeholders with a CSR utility function). Do remember that until the firm is perceived as ‘Good’ 
responsible behavior will most likely erode the firm financially. 
Lastly, column five shows that firms in the Service industry are largely penalized for being 
perceived as ‘Average’ (all three models).  This would suggest that the Service industry is subject 
to two distinct stakeholder groups, one with and the other without a utility function for 
responsible behavior. Engaging in ‘Average’ levels of responsible behavior could create 
uncertainty for both groups around engaging the firm and ultimately lead to negative impact on 
value. 
In sum the relationship between Strength and Value is highly dependent on industry and 
peer group and any holistic assumption regarding Strength and its relationship with value should 
be abandoned.  
Relationship between irresponsible behavior (Concerns) and firm value 
Table 1.7 illustrates the relationship between Concerns and firm value, the first column showing 
the pooled results, indicates that Concern has a negative relationship with respect to firm value 
(‘Quintiles’ and ‘High’ models). Noteworthy is the phenomenon that firms with little Concern 
(‘Good’ or responsible firms) are inherently less valuable (‘Quintiles’ and ‘High’ models), these 
firms also experience a positive marginal relationship between Concern and firm value 
(‘Quintiles’ and ‘High’ models). Interestingly firms who engage in reasonable levels of 
irresponsible behavior (firms perceived as ‘Average’) are inherently more valuable  (all models). 
Lastly as firms engage in more Concern, their marginal relationship between Concern and value 
becomes less negative (‘Quintiles’ and ‘High’ models). This would suggest that firms can only be 
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‘punished’ for engaging in negative behavior up to a certain point after which more irresponsible 
behavior does not have a negative impact on the firm. 
Column two shows similar results for the manufacturing industry with Concern exhibiting a 
negative relationship in respect to value (Quintile and High). Similarly the marginal relationship 
is positive for firms with little concern/‘Good’ (Quintile and High) and ‘Average’ firms 
experience an inherent increase in value (Quintile and Low), while ‘Bad firms experience a 
decrease in value (High and Low).Columns three and four indicate that the relationship between 
concern and value is less clear for the transport and finance industries. 
Finally the last column, suggests that firms’ value, in the service industry, is heavily 
affected by irresponsible behavior (concern). In step with the results from the pooled and 
manufacturing columns concern bears a negative relationship with value (High and Low), but 
‘Average’ firms tend to experience higher inherent value (all models). More surprisingly ‘Bad’ 
firms or firms with the highest levels of concern also experience significant increases in value (all 
models). This would suggest that avoiding irresponsible behavior in the service industry is very 
costly. Perhaps avoiding irresponsible behavior severely limits economic opportunities for firms. 
As such, although there might be negative association between concern and value, foregoing 
certain opportunities might prove costly to firms. Interestingly ‘Good’ firms are not penalized in 
the service industry, as in the manufacturing industry. 
In sum it is clear that that concern exhibits a much stronger and robust relationship to value 
compared to Strength, secondly much of the confounding results exhibited by CSR (Net) 
regressions are explained by the positive relationship ,for certain peer groups, between firm value 
and Concern. 
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Endogeneity 
It’s easy to conceive that a relationship between CSR and firms’ value may simply be 
a manifestation of firm discretionary spending. It is therefore not clear in which 
direction causality flows; CSR
18
could improve firm performance contrariwise firms 
might engage in CSR if and when they have sufficient disposable cash-flows. It is 
indeterminate if firms with significant performance/value and high levels of CSR 
become valuable as a result of their CSR profile or that they increased their CSR 
engagement as they experienced exogenously generated increases in value, or a 
combination of both.  
Endogeneity, with respect to CSR and firm value, will always present itself 
and one can only mitigate rather than eliminate any doubts pertaining to the notion. 
Fortunately, compared to other studies in governance and CSR, we present a novel 
approach to mitigate an endogenous effect between firm value and CSR.  
Restricted OLS 
We construct model (2) following model (1) by including 2 dummies that account for 
a change in a firm’s peer group from t-1 to t. We hope that these dummies will capture 
the economic effect associated when stakeholder perception of a firm changes. 
Specifically in model (2) the positive change dummy (  (  )  ) takes the value of 1 if 
a firm moved to a higher peer group in year t with respect to t-1 otherwise 0, while the 
negative change dummy (  (  )   ) takes the value of 1 if a firm moved to a lower 
peer group in year t with respect to t-1 otherwise 0. 
                                                 
18
 Assuming that the relationship between CSR and value is positive, if not the logic fails. 
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              (   )     ( )     (   )   ( )     (  )     (  )     (    )   
  (        )     (       )     (           )  +             (2)  
An economic argument could suggest that firm value affects CSR, however it is 
unlikely that a firm’s value could affect whether a firm changes peer groups. 
Arguably, a firm could affect its peer group in the long run with successive large 
increases or decreases in its CSR level. We believe it unlikely that performance or 
value would determine whether firms switch peer groups, at least in the short and 
medium term
19
.To further restrict the possibility of endogeneity, we assume that value 
does affect CSR, and explicitly account for this.  
Unlike the earlier regressions we now restrict our sample to only include firms 
who did not experience a change in their CSR level in t with respect to t-1, but did 
experience a change in their peer group in t with respect to t-1. Therefore we now 
eliminate all firms, whose CSR profiles have changed, eliminating the effect of CSR 
on value. Therefore a significant result for either of the peer change dummies 
(  (  )  ,  (  )  ) would indicate that the firm’s value is affected by change in the 
perception of a firm, without any actual change in the CSR profile of the firm. The 
results of model (2)’s regression is presented in table 1.8 
Turning to Panel A, unsurprisingly we find that CSR does not exact a 
relationship on value, proxied by a change in CSR (Net), but ‘Bad’ (PG1 dummy) 
firms are inherently more valuable, with an economically large coefficient of 0.48 
                                                 
19
 We are addressing the change from one peer group to another and not the actual peer group, as 
such at any given time a certain level of CSR could determine which peer group a firm belongs to, 
but not whether it changes peer groups. By extension, even if firm value determined CSR it could 
not at any given time determine which peer group defines the firm, less likely cause a shift in peer 
groups. 
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(sig. at the 1% level). Similarly the positive and negative change dummies are 
insignificant. Panel B, presents the results for Strength and Concern, again Strength 
fails to present a significant marginal relationship with firm value but firms perceived 
as good (PG5 dummy) are inherently more valuable (0.26 at 1% sig.). Turning to the 
dummies capturing change, we see that a positive change in Strength peer groups 
(Pos.) is associated with a significant reduction in value -0.14 (sig. at 5%)
20
. This 
mirrors the general consensus of table 1.6 which shows that, in general, Strength 
exhibits a negative marginal relationship. 
Looking at Concern, we see that Concern still maintains a significant 
relationship, no matter what model we specify. The results reflect the earlier results 
that ‘Low’ levels of Concern (PG2) see firm value reductions (-0.67 at 15 sig.), while 
‘Average’ (PG3 and PG4) and perhaps ‘High’ (PG5) levels of Concern are inherently 
associated with increased firm value (0.87,0.52 and 0.42 respectively all at 1% sig.), 
with the negative marginal relationship softening as firms become increasingly ‘Bad’. 
Looking at the peer change dummies we see that a negative change in Concern peer 
groups (Neg.) is associated with a value increase (0.18 at 1% sig,). This confirms the 
early results indicating a negative marginal relationship between Concern and firm 
value. 
In sum it seems that our restricted models suggest that both Strength and 
Concern have a negative marginal relationship with firm value, irrespective of firm 
performance’s effect on CSR. This would explain the fragile results presented when 
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 One should remember that shareholders are included within stakeholder definitions. If 
shareholders are aware that responsible behaviour reduces value a shift in their perception of the 
firm’s Strengths would reduce value, as they re-adjust their expectation. 
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examining CSR (Net). As our results show the netting off process erroneously 
assumes Strengths and Concerns have opposite relationships with value, in fact they 
both are negative
21
 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Utilizing our ability to proxy for firms’ level of CSR by their relative standing 
amongst their peers, we utilize a two stage least squares model. We use a firm’s peer 
group as an instrumental variable to estimate the endogenous CSR variables. As such 
we assume that a firm’s peer group is exogenously determined, which we believe 
holds true in the short-medium term. Specifically the model (3a) takes the following 
form: 
         
      (   )     (    )     (        )     (       )     (           )  +            (3a)
  
We instrument for CSR in model (3a) with model (3b): 
          (     
   )      (    )      (        )      (       )      (           )   
    (          )   +             (3b) 
 
Specifically, CSR is the firm’s actual level of CSR, which is instrumented by our peer 
group variable (   (          )  ), which takes the values of 1-5 to indicate the firms’ peer 
groups
22
. The two stage least square tests for a linear relationship between CSR and 
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 The implication that one should in fact sum Concerns and Strengths, but again 
the inference would be meaningless, they should be examined separately. 
22
 Using the ‘Quintile’ threshold specification discussed earlier 
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value, similar to the models used by other studies (Gillen et al. ,2010)
23
. The results are 
presented in table 1.9. The first row presents the results between CSR (Net) and value. A 
significantly positive relationship (2.11 at 1% sig.) is shown to exist indicating that CSR 
is not necessarily a manifestation of discretionary spending. In keeping with the theme of 
our results Strength presents an insignificant result, by deduction the relationship for the 
CSR (Net) results are mainly driven by the strongly negative significant relationship (-
3.84 at 1% sig.) between value and Concern. Arguably the results presented above make 
a moot point as most of our original results present that CSR should only be accounted 
for from in industry and peer group point of view.  We believe that the significant results 
in the two stage model above indicate that there, at least, is a relationship between CSR 
and value that is not wholly endogenously determined, the direction might be debatable. 
Discussion 
The use of our aggregation method does not bias results; we find similar results those 
presented by Gillen et al. (2010) when running both OLS
24
 and 2SLS, but with our 
aggregation method. However, as our hypotheses suggested this relationship is not 
robust to the inclusion of peer dummies
25
. The theme of our results suggests that 
engaging in CSR is not positively related to firm value and quite possibly is value 
destroying. The results indicate investors, stakeholders or investment funds perceive 
firms as belonging to certain groups based on the firm’s CSR profile, and behave 
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 As a result we are less interested in the sign of the relationship but more the significance, as our 
finding suggest that assuming a linear relationship across all industries between CSR and value 
might not be correct. 
24
 Results not reported 
25
 Results not reported 
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accordingly. As such a firm’s movement within such a ‘peer bracket’ is inept as the 
perception of the firm has not fundamentally changed. The firm only experiences a 
financial effect from CSR if it is perceived differently. However the value of shifting 
between ‘peer brackets’ could be statistically large, but heavily dependent on industry 
and whether the firm has engaged in more responsible behavior or reduced 
irresponsible behavior.  
Importantly one must note that the effects of Strength and Concern are poorly 
understood and contribute to the negative effect above. The CSR (Net) measure would 
treat firm ‘A’ (with a net CSR score of 0, a Strength score of 1 and Concern score of 
1) exactly the same as firm ‘B’ (with a net CSR score of 0, a Strength score of 4 and 
Concern score of 4). Arguably, however, those firms would have distinctly different 
CSR profiles and be perceived differently by different stakeholders, depending on 
their appetite for responsible and irresponsible behavior. 
When firms are analyzed according to their engagement in Strength the results 
are mixed, Chatterji et al. (2009) allude to the negligible value of Strength measures. 
Strength activities seem to destroy firm value as a general assumption. Interestingly, 
in some industries, firms with above average levels of Strength do receive a value 
boost, perhaps as sound CSR performance proxies for good management (Renneboog, 
Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008a; Renneboog et al., 2008b). This is in line with Kempf & 
Osthof (2007) who present that investors create arbitrary thresholds for positive 
screens. The results might indicate that stakeholders find it much harder to perceive 
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responsible behavior
26
, and as such place a much higher threshold for extending 
benefits associated with responsible activities (Strengths). These results add weight to 
the concept that Strength measures carry little value in determining the effect of CSR 
on a firm. Alternatively the weak performance of Strength on a market measure like 
Tobin’s Q might simply mirror the mispricing inherent with CSR activities, and that 
the market simply cannot capture the value inherent in Strength activities (Kemper & 
Martin, 2010; Kempf & Osthoff, 2007).  
Conversely, the Concern results are very significant. Concern activities are 
negatively related to value, with the restricted OLS indicating stakeholders respond 
positively to reductions in Concern. However, firms who engage in average levels of 
Concern experience a value boost, perhaps as they are not precluded from the 
advantages and exploits some Concern opportunities present, and/or stakeholders 
focus their attention on the leaders and laggards along the Concern continuum. Finally 
firms with a high engagement in Concern have a much lower marginal cost for 
engaging in Concern activities. Once a firm is considered ‘Bad’ the firm’s value 
would be reduced by a much lower marginal rate. Our results confirm the notions of 
SRI investing (Benabou & Tirole, 2010; Lee & Faff, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2008b) 
where SRI funds are more likely to screen along negative criteria, which could be 
driving our results. 
As noted, (Manescu, 2011; Statman & Glushkov, 2009), the relationship between 
CSR and industry is important and varies greatly (Griffin & Mahon, 1997). More 
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 Or perhaps fail to value the benefits associated with Strength activities, in that they perceive the 
Strength activity but are uncertain around the economic impact of the activity.  
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importantly any statement regarding an overall relationship between CSR and value 
should be met with caution. Overwhelmingly the Strength results are very industry 
specific with inverse results between some industries, while the Concern results had 
greater congruence between industries. For the most part manufacturing and service 
industries are most sensitive to CSR
27
, with most other industries remaining mute on 
the relationship between CSR and firm value. The finance and transport industries 
seems especially resilient to Concern or irresponsible behavior with no significant 
relationship coming afore. Our results might be attributed to the findings of 
Fernández-Kranz & Santaló (2010) who show that competition for consumers drives 
CSR, this follows our results as the manufacturing and service industries are perhaps 
more sensitive to consumers.  
The service industry shows that firms with high levels of CSR are devalued, 
with a marginal effect that is negative. This contrasts Margolis & Elfenbein’s  (2008) 
meta-analysis, which indicates that engaging in CSR incurred no financial penalty. 
This is perhaps echoing Benabou & Tirole (2010) showing that each industry is 
subject to different stakeholder demands. It might be that manufacturing and service 
industries, which are heavily dependent on labor and interconnected with many 
suppliers and customers, who depend on the firms outputs, are much more sensitive to 
stakeholder action. As such the service and manufacturing firms need to sate their 
demands with CSR, and by doing so extract benefit.  
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 Surprisingly, finance and transport seem especially sensitive to Strength, where manufacturing 
fails to  
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The transport industry shows the most fragile relationship between CSR and value 
with some models presenting conflicting results. Furthermore transport fails to 
replicate the marginal effect of CSR as highly negative for industry leaders; this is 
true for every other industry. It might be that engaging in too much CSR is subject to 
marginal reducing returns and once all the cost effective measures of CSR are 
exploited any further engagement in CSR is value destroying. Surprisingly engaging 
in below average levels of CSR in the service and manufacturing industries is 
associated with value increases and the marginal effect at that level is positive as well 
for all industries except the service industry. The finance industry is the only industry 
in which firms with high levels of Strength (perceived as ‘Good’) receive an increase 
in value.  
The most surprising finding is that engaging in some Concern activities creates 
value with a significant relationship between firms with average levels of Concern and 
firm value in the manufacturing and service industries. We believe that firms that are 
seen as average escape the negative connotations associated with Concern. It is likely 
that stakeholders focus on firms with high amounts of Concern, and are ignorant to 
the activity of average firms. Furthermore, engaging in some concern allows the firms 
to exploit certain benefits presented by ‘dirty’ opportunities or save on certain costs 
associated with adjusting activities or facilities to remove the Concern aspect.  It must 
be noted that the service industry does not seem to unduly penalize ‘Bad’ firms. 
Further Work 
To complete this study and validate our hypotheses we will adapt our equations 
presented earlier to test the relationship between ROA, ROE and CSR. Secondly we 
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will increase the control variables included in our Tobin’s Q results to substantiate the 
robustness of our findings. More importantly we will extend our study to account for 
the effects of different CSR categories on firm value and performance, while 
maintaining the distinction between Strength and Concern. 
 
Conclusion 
This study shows that CSR exacts a dynamic relationship that is perhaps non-
continuous and certainly not linear on firm value.  More importantly we control for 
endogeneity in two different ways and find that CSR definitely affects firm value 
beyond what might be endogenously presumed. The relationship is heavily affected 
by a firms relative standing amongst its peers and industry.  
We show that practitioners need to be careful in valuing the effect of CSR 
activities that firm’s undertake, and make clear distinctions between activities that 
relate to abstaining from bad as opposed to engaging in good. Most notably 
practitioners should re-evaluate the value of Concern and Strength activities as the 
implications might be inverse, and place greater pressure on rating agencies to create 
more dynamic rating systems. Similarly our results provide valuable insight for 
managers in making CSR decisions. Importantly management should ensure that CSR 
activities are of a sufficient magnitude to set the firm apart from its peers, but be 
careful to engage in Strength activities or needlessly refrain from Concern activities.  
Our study provides a deeper understanding of CSR for academics and should 
encourage deeper investigation into the murky field. Lastly our results imply that the 
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market for CSR might not be driving firms toward better social responsibility and that 
relying on the free hand of economics to sate problems relating to the public good 
might not be ideal. Regulators should be aware that regulatory pressure is needed to 
reduce the economic payoff from engaging in Concern activities. Conjunctly 
regulation aimed at increasing the frequency, transparency and standardization around 
CSR reporting will allow stakeholders to better evaluate CSR and remove uncertainty, 
which could be penalizing CSR activity.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1.1 
 Number of firms in sample period 
  Year Firms 
1991 546 
1992 556 
1993 548 
1994 546 
1995 554 
1996 561 
1997 563 
1998 565 
1999 573 
2000 561 
2001 991 
2002 1002 
2003 2728 
2004 2802 
2005 2783 
2006 2732 
2007 2702 
2008 2597 
2009 2655 
Table 1 shows the number of firms included 
in the study assessed by KLD for each 
calendar year from 1991 through to 2009. 
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Table 1.2 
     KLD ESG Descriptive Statistics 
           
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
      Net CSR 26565 -0.02 0.06 -0.40 0.34 
Strength 26565 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.49 
Concern 26565 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.51 
      Community Net 26565 0.01 0.11 -0.61 1.00 
Community Strength 26565 0.03 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Community Concern 26565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.75 
      Corporate Governance Net 26565 -0.05 0.17 -1.00 0.75 
Corporate Governance Strength 26565 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.75 
Corporate Governance Concern 26565 0.08 0.14 0.00 1.00 
      Diversity Net 26565 -0.04 0.22 -0.67 0.88 
Diversity Strength 26565 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.88 
Diversity Concern 26565 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.67 
      Employment Net 26565 -0.03 0.16 -0.80 0.83 
Employment Strength 26565 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.83 
Employment Concern 26565 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.80 
      Environmental Net 26565 -0.01 0.10 -0.83 0.60 
Environmental Strength 26565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.80 
Environmental Concern 26565 0.03 0.10 0.00 1.00 
      Humanity Net 24915 -0.01 0.07 -0.75 1.00 
Humanity Strength 24915 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Humanity Concern 26565 0.02 0.08 0.00 1.00 
      Product Net 26565 -0.03 0.15 -1.00 0.75 
Product Strength 26565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.75 
Product Concern 26565 0.05 0.13 0.00 1.00 
            
Table 2. presents the descriptive statistics of the Net, Strength and Concern scores for each of the KLD ESG categories as 
well as the overall score. The scores presented are transformed from the binary aggregation system used by KLD and 
represent a percentage of possible points obtained. The statistics are calculated on the pooled sample, spanning calendar 
years 1991 through 2009. 
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Table 1.3 
     Financial Descriptive Statistics 
           
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Adjusted Price 26565 28.66 58.06 1.00 3561.00 
Adjusted Shares ('000) 26565 204,401 588,845 372 22900000 
Average Monthly Volume ('000) 26565 1,317,066 5,372,910 189 484000000 
Market Capitalization ('000) 26565 $5,925,838 $19,900,000 $5,831 $602,000,000 
      ln(Mcap) 26565 14.15 1.56 8.67 20.22 
ln(Turnover) 26565 1.65 1.09 -4.43 7.74 
Tobin's Q 26163 2.00 1.80 0.34 56.98 
Market to Book 26162 3.49 56.25 -2266.34 7508.73 
      EBIT to Assets 26152 0.07 0.17 -12.48 1.95 
EBIT to Equity 26145 0.20 5.66 -568.93 324.34 
      Cash to Total Assets 26165 0.16 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Cash to Current Liabilities 20558 1.29 3.22 0.00 265.71 
Interest Expense to Total Liabilities 22366 0.03 0.02 -0.01 1.13 
Total Liabilities to Total Assets 26101 0.57 0.28 0.00 7.71 
Foreign Sales to Sales 7278 0.10 0.22 -0.10 8.87 
Advertising to Sales 8694 0.03 0.07 0.00 3.32 
Table 3. reports the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample spanning calendar years 1991 through 2009.(‘000) indicate figures presented in 
thousands. EBIT is earnings before interest and tax, Ln(Mcap)  is the log of market capitalization, ln(Turnover) is the log of volume over shares 
outstanding. 
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Table 1.4 
   Shift in CSR scores over time 
 
    Year Net Strength Concern 
    1991 0.01 0.04 0.03 
1992 0.01 0.05 0.04 
1993 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1994 -0.01 0.05 0.06 
1995 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1996 0.01 0.06 0.04 
1997 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1998 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1999 0.00 0.06 0.07 
2000 -0.01 0.06 0.07 
Average 0.00 0.06 0.06 
    2001 -0.01 0.04 0.05 
2002 -0.02 0.04 0.06 
2003 -0.02 0.02 0.04 
2004 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2005 -0.03 0.02 0.05 
2006 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2007 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2008 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2009 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
Average -0.03 0.03 0.06 
Table 6 reports the yearly average CSR score of Net-CSR, 
Strength and Concern for calendar years 1991 through 2009. 
The average score for each decade is also reported. 
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Table 1.5 
                    Relationship between firm value and CSR 
                                          
Pooled 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Transport 
 
Finance 
 
Service 
Variable   Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
                     
CSR 
  
(+) ** 
   
(+) ** 
          
(+) *** (+) *** 
Bad  
 
(+) *** (+) ** 
  
(+) *** 
           
(+) ** 
 
Bad * CSR 
 
(+) ** 
       
(+) ** 
 
(+) ** 
 
(+) ** 
     
(−) ** 
Average 
                    
Average * CSR 
                   
Good 
     
(+) *** 
          
(−) *** (−) ** (−) *** 
Good *  
CSR   (−) ** (−) *** (−) **     (−) ** (−) **       (+) **           (−) *** (−) *** 
Table 1.5 reports a reduced form results of the relationship between firm value and CSR employing 3 different specifications over the pooled sample and within each of four industries, 
defined by 2-digit SIC code, from calendar year 1991 through 2009. Each of the Quint., High and Low columns report the regression results obtained when the ‘Quintile’, ‘High’ and 
‘Low’ threshold specifications used, respectively. ‘Quintile’ defines firms within 5 peer groups based on quintiles using the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentiles, ‘High’ defines firms 
using the 10th, 30th , 70th and 90th percentiles and the ‘Low’ threshold set defines peer groups based on the 10th, 40th, 60th and 90th percentiles. Peer groups are calculated at the end of 
each year t for each industry j and take the value of 1 if a firm falls within that peer group in that year or 0 otherwise. CSR represents the level of CSR undertaken by each firm. Bad, 
Average and Good approximate for the low, mid and high peer group dummies across the three threshold specifications. We control for year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at 
the firm level. Specifically we model:                (   )     ( )     (   )   ( )     (    )     (        )     (       )     (       )            . 
Tobin's Q is calculated as market value of assets over book value of assets, where market value is equal to total assets plus market equity less book equity at the end of each year t. Size is 
the log of market capitalization at the end of each year t (not reported). Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets at the end of each year t, foreign is foreign sales to sales at the end 
of each year t, advertising is advertising expense to sales  at the end of each year t. (+),(−) indicate a positive or negative relationship between the variable and Tobin’s Q based on the 
sign of the corresponding coefficient in the regression results. *,**,*** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 1.6 
                    Relationship between firm value and Strength 
                                          
Pooled 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Transport 
 
Finance 
 
Service 
Variable   Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
                     
Strength 
 
(−) ** 
 
(−) *** 
    
(−) ** 
 
(+) ** 
 
(−) ** 
 
(−) ** 
    
Low 
                    
Low * Strength 
                   
Average 
     
(+) ** 
           
(−) ** (−) *** (−) *** 
Average * Strength (+) ** 
       
(+) *** (+) ** 
       
(+) ** (+) ** 
High 
 
(+) ** 
 
(+) ** 
      
(−) *** (−) *** (+) ** (+) ** (+) ** 
    
High * Strength (−) **                   (−) ***               
Table 1.6 reports a reduced form results of the relationship between firm value and Strength employing 3 different specifications over the pooled sample and within each of four 
industries, defined by 2-digit SIC code, from calendar year 1991 through 2009. Each of the Quint., High and Low columns report the regression results obtained when the ‘Quintile’, 
‘High’ and ‘Low’ threshold specifications  used, respectively. ‘Quintile’ defines firms within 5 peer groups based on firms that failed to score and firms who fall in the 40th, 60th and 
80th percentiles, ‘High’ defines firms in 4 peer groups for the firms who failed to score and firms who fall in the 30th , 70th and 90th percentiles and the ‘Low’ threshold set defines 4 
peer groups based on firms who failed to score and firms who fall in 40th, 60th and 90th percentiles. Peer groups are calculated at the end of each year t for each industry j and take the 
value of 1 if a firm falls within that peer group in that year or 0 otherwise. CSR represents the level of CSR undertaken by each firm. Bad, Average and Good approximate for the low, 
mid and high peer group dummies across the three threshold specifications. We control for year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Specifically we 
model:                (        )     ( )     (   )   ( )     (    )     (        )     (       )     (       )            . Tobin's Q is calculated as 
market value of assets over book value of assets, where market value is equal to total assets plus market equity less book equity at the end of each year t. Size is the log of market 
capitalization at the end of each year t (not reported). Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets at the end of each year t, foreign is foreign sales to sales at the end of each year t, 
advertising is advertising expense to sales  at the end of each year t. (+),(−) indicate a positive or negative relationship between the variable and Tobin’s Q based on the sign of the 
corresponding coefficient in the regression results. *,**,*** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
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Table 1.7 
                    Relationship between firm value and Concern 
                                          
    Pooled 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Transport 
 
Finance 
 
Service 
Variable   Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
 
Quint. High Low 
                     
Concern 
 
(−) *** (−) *** 
 
(−) *** (−) *** 
 
(−) ** 
     
(−) *** 
 
(−) *** (−) *** 
Low 
 
(−) *** (−) ** 
  
(−) *** 
             
Low * Concern (+) *** (+) *** 
 
(+) *** (+) *** 
 
(+) ** 
        
(+) ** 
 
Average 
 
(+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
        
(+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
Average * 
Concern 
  
(−) ** 
   
(−) *** 
    
(+) ** 
   
(−) ** 
  
High 
     
(−) ** 
 
(−) ** 
         
(+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
High * Concern (+) ** (+) ***                                 
Table 1.7 reports a reduced form results of the relationship between firm value and Concern employing 3 different specifications over the pooled sample and within each of four 
industries, defined by 2-digit SIC code, from calendar year 1991 through 2009. Each of the Quint., High and Low columns report the regression results obtained when the ‘Quintile’, 
‘High’ and ‘Low’ threshold specifications  used, respectively. ‘Quintile’ defines firms within 5 peer groups based on firms that failed to score and firms who fall in the 40th, 60th and 
80th percentiles, ‘High’ defines firms in 4 peer groups for the firms who failed to score and firms who fall in the 30th, 70th and 90th percentiles and the ‘Low’ threshold set defines 4 
peer groups based on firms who failed to score and firms who fall in 40th, 60th and 90th percentiles.. Peer groups are calculated at the end of each year t for each industry j and take the 
value of 1 if a firm falls within that peer group in that year or 0 otherwise. CSR represents the level of CSR undertaken by each firm. Bad, Average and Good approximate for the low, 
mid and high peer group dummies across the three threshold       specifications. We control for year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Specifically we model: 
                (       )     ( )     (   )   ( )     (    )     (        )     (       )     (       )            . Tobin's Q is calculated as market 
value of assets over book value of assets, where market value is equal to total assets plus market equity less book equity at the end of each year t. Size is the log of market capitalization 
at the end of each year t (not reported). Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets at the end of each year t, foreign is foreign sales to sales at the end of each year t, advertising is 
advertising expense to sales  at the end of each year t. (+),(−) indicate a positive or negative relationship between the variable and Tobin’s Q based on the sign of the corresponding 
coefficient in the regression results. *,**,*** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.   
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Table 
1.8 
                  Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and firm value (Restricted 
OLS) 
          
Panel: A 
 
c. CSR PG1 PG2 PG4 PG5 I1 I2 I4 I5 Pos. Neg. Size Debt Foreign Adv. Obs. R^2 
        
  
         
Net 
-
1.59*** 
0.53 0.48*** 0.23 0.19 0.19 
5.8
1 
4.93 -5.77 -2.11 -0.05 0.02 
0.276**
* 
-
0.57*** 
-
0.00*** 
2.56**
* 
6725 
0.174
5 
   
 
               
Panel: B 
 
c. CSR PG2 PG3 PG4 PG5 I2 I3 I4 I5 Pos. Neg. Size Debt Foreign Adv. Obs. R^2 
                   
Strength 
-
1.91*** -3.48 -0.17 0.13 0.153 
0.26**
* 
3.6
9 
- 4.66 
-0.03 
-
0.14** -0.11 0.24*** 
-
0.59*** -.00*** 
1.92**
* 
1084
1 
0.161
9 
   
 
               
Concern 
-
3.38*** 
12.86*
* 
-
0.67*** 
0.87**
* 
0.52**
* 
0.42**
* - 
-
34.36*** 
-
23.06**
* 
-
20.48**
* -0.03 
0.18**
* 0.34*** 
-
0.38*** 
-
0.00*** 
3.05**
* 9214 
0.204
2 
                   Table 1.8 reports the regression coefficients for the relationship between firm value and CSR over the pooled restricted sample from calendar year 1991 through 2009 using the 
‘Quintile’ thresholds. Panel A reports the results for Net CSR levels undertaken by firms (Strengths less Concerns), Panel B reports the results for the relationship between Strengths 
and Concerns against firm value separately. CSR represents the level of CSR undertaken by each firm within each of Net-CSR, Strength and Concern. Peer groups are calculated at the 
end of each year t for each industry j and take the value of 1 if a firm falls within that peer group in that year or 0 otherwise. Pos. represents the positive change dummy (  (  )   ) 
takes the value of 1 if a firm moved to a higher peer group in year t with respect to t-1 otherwise 0, while Neg. presents the negative change dummy (   (  )   ) takes the value of 1 if 
a firm moved to a lower peer group in year t with respect to t-1 otherwise 0. We restrict the sample to only include firms who did not experience a change in their CSR level in t with 
respect to t-1, but did experience a change in their peer group in t with respect to t-1. For Panel A, peer group 1 represents the 20th percentile and below, peer group 2 represents the 
20th through 40th percentiles, peer group 3 represents the 40th through 60th percentiles, peer group  4 represents the 60th through 80th percentiles and peer group 5 represents the 80th 
and above percentiles. For Panel B, peer group 1 represents firms with no score, peer group 2 represents firms in the 40th percentile and below, peer group 3 represents the 40th through 
60th percentiles, peer group 4 represents the 60th through 80th percentiles and peer group 5 represents the 80th and above percentiles We control for year fixed effects, industry fixed 
effects using 2-digit SIC codes and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Specifically we model:                (   )     ( )     (   )   ( )     (  )   
  (  )     (    )     (        )     (       )     (           )  +         . Tobin's Q is calculated as market value of assets over book value of assets, where market 
value is equal to total assets plus market equity less book equity at the end of each year t. Size is the log of market capitalization at the end of each year t, Debt is the total liabilities over 
total assets at the end of each year t, foreign is foreign sales to sales at the end of each year t, advertising is advertising expense to sales at the end of each year t..*,**,*** indicate 
significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 1.9 
        Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and firm value (2SLS) 
 
c. CSR Size Debt Foreign Adv. Obs. R^2 
        
 
Net -0.729*** 2.11*** 0.213*** -0.74*** -0.005*** 2.97*** 19605 0.15 
         
Strength -0.57** 0.069 0.205*** -0.76*** -0.0049*** 3.09*** 19605 0.15 
         
Concern -1.304*** -3.84*** 0.265*** -0.68*** -0.004*** 2.99*** 19605 0.16 
Table 1.9 reports the two stage least squared regression coefficients for the relationship between firm value and CSR over the pooled sample from calendar year 1991 through 2009. We 
control for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects using 2-digit SIC codes and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Specifically we model: 
                (   )     (    )     (        )     (       )     (           )  +         . 
We instrument CSR as follows:           (     
    )      (    )      (        )      (       )      (           )      (          )  +         . CSR is the firm’s 
actual level of CSR, which is instrumented by our peer group variable (   (          )  ), which takes the values of 1-5 to indicate the firms’ peer group. Peer groups are calculated at 
the end of each year t for each industry j. A Peer group value of 1 represents the 20th percentile and below, 2 represents the 20th through 40th percentiles, 3 represents the 40th through 
60th percentiles, 4 represents the 60th through 80th percentiles and finally the value 5 represents the 80th and above percentiles. Tobin’s Q is calculated as market value of assets over 
book value of assets, where market value is equal to total assets plus market equity less book equity at the end of each year t. Size is the log of market capitalization at the end of each year 
t, Debt is the total liabilities over total assets at the end of each year t, foreign is foreign sales to sales at the end of each year t, advertising is advertising expense to sales at the end of each 
year t..*,**,*** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Appendix 
Tables 
Table 2.                               
Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and firm value 
                    
Panel: A 
 
c. 
 
CSR 
 
PG1 
 
PG2 
 
PG4 
 
PG5 
 
I1 
 
I2 
 
I4 
 
I5 
 
Size 
 
Debt 
 
Foreign 
 
Adv. 
 
Obs. R^2 
                               
Net -1.66 *** 1.56 
 
0.26 *** 0.02 
 
0.13 
 
0.12 
 
3.74 ** 0.64 
 
-5.07 ** -3.24 
 
0.23 ** -0.71 *** 0.00 *** 3.01 *** 19605 0.16 
                               
Panel: B 
 
c. 
 
CSR 
 
PG2 
 
PG3 
 
PG4 
 
PG5 
 
I2 
 
I3 
 
I4 
 
I5 
 
Size 
 
Debt 
 
Foreign 
 
Adv. 
 
Obs. R^2 
                               
Strength -1.80 *** -15.79 ** -0.31 
 
0.14 
 
0.20 
 
0.19 ** 21.26 ** 12.28 ** 14.66 ** 11.86 ** 0.23 *** -0.73 *** 0.00 *** 3.18 *** 19605 0.15 
                               
Concern -2.46 *** -14.81 *** -0.70 *** 0.64 *** 0.30 *** 0.13 
 
30.14 *** -1.04 
 
7.51 
 
9.18 ** 0.29 *** -0.63 *** 0.00 *** 2.97 *** 19605 0.1658 
                               
Table 2 reports the regression coefficients for the relationship between firm value and CSR over the pooled sample from calendar year 1991 through 2009 using the ‘Quintile’ thresholds. Panel A 
reports the results for Net CSR levels undertaken by firms (Strengths less Concerns), Panel B reports the results for the relationship between Strengths and Concerns against firm value separately. 
CSR represents the level of CSR undertaken by each firm within each of Net-CSR, Strength and Concern. Peer groups are calculated at the end of each year t for each industry j and take the value of 1 
if a firm falls within that peer group in that year or 0 otherwise For Panel A, peer group 1 represents the 20th percentile and below, peer group 2 represents the 20th through 40th percentiles, peer 
group 3 represents the 40th through 60th percentiles, peer group 4 represents the 60th through 80th percentiles and peer group 5 represents the 80th and above percentiles. For Panel B, peer group 1 
represents firms with no score, peer group 2 represents firms in the 40th percentile and below, peer group 3 represents the 40th through 60th percentiles, peer group 4 represents the 60th through 80th 
percentiles and peer group 5 represents the 80th and above percentiles We control for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects using 2-digit SIC codes and cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
Specifically we model:                (   )     ( )     (   )   ( )     (    )     (        )     (       )     (           )            . Tobin's Q is calculated as 
market value of assets over book value of assets, where market value is equal to total assets plus market equity less book equity at the end of each year t. Size is the log of market capitalization at the 
end of each year t, Debt is the total liabilities over total assets at the end of each year t, foreign is foreign sales to sales at the end of each year t, advertising is advertising expense to sales at the end of 
each year t..*,**,*** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Graph Four 
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KLD Categories. 
Community 
Strengths 
Charitable Giving (COM-str-A). The company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing three year net earnings 
before taxes (NEBT) to charity, or has otherwise been notably generous in its giving. In 2002, KLD renamed the 
Generous Giving Strength as Charitable Giving. 
 
Innovative Giving (COM-str-B). The company has a notably innovative giving program that supports nonprofit 
organizations, particularly those promoting self-sufficiency among the economically disadvantaged. Companies 
that permit nontraditional federated charitable giving drives in the workplace are often noted in this section as well. 
 
Non-US Charitable Giving (COM-str-F). The company has made a substantial effort to make charitable 
contributions abroad, as well as in the U.S. To qualify, a company must make at least 
20% of its giving, or have taken notably innovative initiatives in its giving program, outside the 
U.S. 
 
Support for Housing (COM-str-C). The company is a prominent participant in public/private partnerships that 
support housing initiatives for the economically disadvantaged, e.g., the National Equity Fund or the Enterprise 
Foundation. 
 
Support for Education (COM-str-D). The company has either been notably innovative in its support for primary or 
secondary school education, particularly for those programs that benefit the economically disadvantaged, or the 
company has prominently supported job-training programs for youth. In 1994, KLD added the Support for 
Education Strength. 
 
Indigenous Peoples Relations (COM-str-E). The company has established relations with indigenous peoples in the 
areas of its proposed or current operations that respect the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual 
property of the indigenous peoples. KLD began assigning this strength in 2000. In 2002 KLD moved this strength 
rating into the Human Rights area.  
 
Volunteer Programs (COM-str-G). The company has an exceptionally strong volunteer program.  In 2005, KLD 
added the Volunteer Programs Strength.  
 
Other Strength (COM-str-X). The company has either an exceptionally strong in-kind giving program or engages 
in other notably positive community activities. 
 
Concern  
Investment Controversies (COM-con-A). The company is a financial institution whose lending or investment 
practices have led to controversies, particularly ones related to the Community Reinvestment Act. 
 
Negative Economic Impact (COM-con-B). The company’s actions have resulted in major controversies concerning 
its economic impact on the community. These controversies can include issues related to environmental 
contamination, water rights disputes, plant closings, "put-or-pay" contracts with trash incinerators, or other 
company actions that adversely affect the quality of life, tax base, or property values in the community. 
 
Indigenous Peoples Relations (COM-con-C). The company has been involved in serious controversies with 
indigenous peoples that indicate the company has not respected the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and 
intellectual property of indigenous peoples. KLD began assigning this concern in 2000. In 2002 KLD moved this 
strength rating into the Human Rights area. 
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Tax Disputes (COM-con-D). The company has recently been involved in major tax disputes involving Federal, 
state, local or non-U.S. government authorities, or is involved in controversies over its tax obligations to the 
community. In 2005, KLD moved Tax Disputes from Corporate Governance to Community. 
 
Other Concern (COM-con-X). The company is involved with a controversy that has mobilized community 
opposition, or is engaged in other noteworthy community controversies. 
Corporate Governance 
In 2002 KLD renamed the Other category to Corporate Governance in order to better communicate the intent and 
content of 
these ratings. 
 
 
Strengths  
Limited Compensation (CGOV-str-A). The company has recently awarded notably low levels of compensation to 
its top management or its board members. The limit for a rating is total compensation of less than $500,000 per 
year for a CEO or $30,000 per year for outside directors. 
 
Ownership Strength (CGOV-str-C). The company owns between 20% and 50% of another company KLD has cited 
as having an area of social strength, or is more than 20% owned by a firm that KLD has rated as having social 
strengths. When a company owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling interest, and KLD treats the 
second firm as if it is a division of the first. 
 
Transparency Strength (CGOV-str-D). The company is particularly effective in reporting on a wide range of social 
and environmental performance measures, or is exceptional in reporting on one particular measure. In 2005, KLD 
added the Transparency Strength, which incorporates information from the former Environment: Communications 
Strength (ENV-str-E) as part of its content. 
 
Political Accountability Strength (CGOV-str-E). The company has shown markedly responsible leadership on 
public policy issues and/or has an exceptional record of transparency and accountability concerning its political 
involvement in state or federal-level U.S. politics, or in non-U.S. politics. In 2005, KLD added the Political 
Accountability Strength. 
 
Other Strength (CGOV-str-X). The company has a unique and positive corporate culture, or has undertaken a 
noteworthy initiative not covered by KLD’s other corporate governance ratings. 
 
Concerns 
High Compensation (CGOV-con-B). The company has recently awarded notably high levels of compensation to its 
top management or its board members. The limit for a rating is total compensation of more than $10 million per 
year for a CEO or $100,000 per year for outside directors. 
 
Ownership Concern (CGOV-con-F). The company owns between 20% and 50% of a company 
KLD has cited as having an area of social concern, or is more than 20% owned by a firm KLD has rated as having 
areas of concern. When a company owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling interest, and KLD 
treats the second firm as if it is a division of the first. 
 
Accounting Concern (CGOV-con-G). The company is involved in significant accounting-related controversies. In 
2005, KLD added the Accounting Concern. 
 
Transparency Concern (CGOV-con-H). The company is distinctly weak in reporting on a wide range of social and 
environmental performance measures. In 2005, KLD added the Transparency Concern. 
vii 
 
 
Political Accountability Concern (CGOV-con-I). The company has been involved in noteworthy controversies on 
public policy issues and/or has a very poor record of transparency and accountability concerning its political 
involvement in state or federal-level U.S. politics, or in non-U.S. politics. In 2005, KLD added the Political 
Accountability Concern. 
 
Other Concern (CGOV-con-X). The company is involved with a controversy not covered by KLD’s other 
corporate governance ratings. 
 
Diversity 
Strengths 
CEO (DIV-str-A). The company's chief executive officer is a woman or a member of a minority group. 
 
Promotion (DIV-str-B). The company has made notable progress in the promotion of women and minorities, 
particularly to line positions with profit-and-loss responsibilities in the corporation. 
 
Board of Directors (DIV-str-C). Women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold four seats or more (with no double 
counting) on the board of directors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the 
board numbers less than 12. 
 
Work/Life Benefits (DIV-str-D). The company has outstanding employee benefits or other programs addressing 
work/life concerns, e.g., childcare, elder care, or flextime. In 2005, KLD renamed this strength from Family 
Benefits Strength. 
 
Women & Minority Contracting (DIV-str-E). The company does at least 5% of its subcontracting, or otherwise has 
a demonstrably strong record on purchasing or contracting, with women and/or minority-owned businesses. 
 
Employment of the Disabled (DIV-str-F). The company has implemented innovative hiring programs; other 
innovative human resource programs for the disabled, or otherwise has a superior reputation as an employer of the 
disabled. 
 
Gay & Lesbian Policies (DIV-str-G). The company has implemented notably progressive policies toward its gay 
and lesbian employees. In particular, it provides benefits to the domestic partners of its employees. In 1995, KLD 
added the Gay & Lesbian Policies Strength, which was originally titled the Progressive Gay/Lesbian Policies 
strength. 
 
Other Strength (DIV-str-X). The company has made a notable commitment to diversity that is not covered by other 
KLD ratings. 
 
Concerns 
Controversies (DIV-con-A). The company has either paid substantial fines or civil penalties as a result of 
affirmative action controversies, or has otherwise been involved in major controversies related to affirmative action 
issues. 
 
Non-Representation (DIV-con-B). The company has no women on its board of directors or among its senior line 
managers. 
 
Other Concern (DIV-con-X). The company is involved in diversity controversies not covered by other KLD 
ratings. 
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Employee Relations 
Strengths 
Union Relations (EMP-str-A). The company has taken exceptional steps to treat its unionized workforce fairly. 
KLD renamed this strength from Strong Union Relations. 
 
No-Layoff Policy (EMP-str-B). The company has maintained a consistent no-layoff policy. KLD has not assigned 
strengths for this issue since 1994. 
 
Cash Profit Sharing (EMP-str-C). The company has a cash profit-sharing program through which it has recently 
made distributions to a majority of its workforce. 
 
Employee Involvement (EMP-str-D). The company strongly encourages worker involvement and/or ownership 
through stock options available to a majority of its employees; gain sharing, stock ownership, sharing of financial 
information, or participation in management decision making. 
 
Retirement Benefits Strength (EMP-str-F). The company has a notably strong retirement benefits program. KLD 
renamed this strength from Strong Retirement Benefits. 
 
Health and Safety Strength (EMP-str-G). The company has strong health and safety programs. 
 
Other Strength (EMP-str-X). The company has strong employee relations initiatives not covered by other KLD 
ratings. 
 
Concerns 
Union Relations (EMP-con-A). The company has a history of notably poor union relations. KLD renamed this 
concern from Poor Union Relations. 
 
Health and Safety Concern (EMP-con-B). The company recently has either paid substantial fines or civil penalties 
for willful violations of employee health and safety standards, or has been otherwise involved in major health and 
safety controversies. 
 
Workforce Reductions (EMP-con-C). The company has made significant reductions in its workforce in recent 
years. 
Retirement Benefits Concern (EMP-con-D). The company has either a substantially under funded defined benefit 
pension plan, or an inadequate retirement benefits program. In 2004, KLD renamed this concern from 
Pension/Benefits Concern. 
 
Other Concern (EMP-con-X). The company is involved in an employee relations controversy that is not covered by 
other KLD ratings. 
Environment 
Strengths 
Beneficial Products and Services (ENV-str-A). The company derives substantial revenues from innovative 
remediation products, environmental services, or products that promote the efficient use of energy, or it has 
developed innovative products with environmental benefits. (The term “environmental service” does not include 
services with questionable environmental effects, such as landfills, incinerators, waste-to-energy plants, and deep 
injection wells.) 
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Pollution Prevention (ENV-str-B). The company has notably strong pollution prevention programs including both 
emissions reductions and toxic-use reduction programs. 
 
Recycling (ENV-str-C). The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw materials in its 
manufacturing processes, or a major factor in the recycling industry. 
Clean Energy (ENV-str-D). The company has taken significant measures to reduce its impact on climate change 
and air pollution through use of renewable energy and clean fuels or through energy efficiency. The company has 
demonstrated a commitment to promoting climate-friendly policies and practices outside its own operations. KLD 
renamed the Alternative Fuels strength as Clean Energy Strength. 
 
Communications (ENV-str-E). The company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notably 
substantive environmental report, or has notably effective internal communications systems in place for 
environmental best practices. KLD began assigning strengths for this issue in 1996, and then incorporated the issue 
with the Corporate Governance: Transparency rating 
 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (ENV-str-F). The company maintains its property, plant, and equipment with 
above average environmental performance for its industry. KLD has not assigned strengths for this issue since 
1995.  
 
Other Strength (ENV-str-X). The company has demonstrated a superior commitment to management systems, 
voluntary programs, or other environmentally proactive activities. 
 
Concerns 
Hazardous Waste (ENV-con-A). The company's liabilities for hazardous waste sites exceed $50 million, or the 
company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for waste management violations. 
 
Regulatory Problems (ENV-con-B). The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for 
violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, or it has a pattern of regulatory controversies under the 
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act or other major environmental regulations. 
 
Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ENV-con-C). The company is among the top manufacturers of ozone depleting 
chemicals such as HCFCs, methyl chloroform, methylene chloride, or bromines. 
 
Substantial Emissions (ENV-con-D). The company's legal emissions of toxic chemicals (as defined by and reported 
to the EPA) from individual plants into the air and water are among the highest of the companies followed by 
KLD. 
 
Agricultural Chemicals (ENV-con-E). The company is a substantial producer of agricultural chemicals, i.e., 
pesticides or chemical fertilizers. 
 
Climate Change (ENV-con-F). The company derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil and its 
derivative fuel products, or the company derives substantial revenues indirectly from the combustion of coal or oil 
and its derivative fuel products. Such companies include electric utilities, transportation companies with fleets of 
vehicles, auto and truck manufacturers, and other transportation equipment companies. In 1999, KLD added the 
Climate Change Concern. 
 
Other Concern (ENV-con-X). The company has been involved in an environmental controversy that is not covered 
by other KLD ratings. 
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Human Rights 
In 2002 KLD reorganized the presentation of data in the Non-U.S. Operations and Community category. Ratings 
in the Human Rights area were mostly taken from the former Non-U.S. Operations category. 
 
Strengths 
Positive Record in South Africa (HUM-str-A). The company’s social record in South Africa is noteworthy. KLD 
assigned strengths in this category in 1994 and 1995.  
 
Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength (HUM-str-D). The company has established relations with indigenous 
peoples near its proposed or current operations (either in or outside the U.S.) that respect the sovereignty, land, 
culture, human rights, and intellectual property of indigenous peoples. In 2000, KLD added the Indigenous Peoples 
Relations Strength. In 2004, KLD moved the Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength from Community to Human 
Rights. 
 
Labor Rights Strength (HUM-str-G). The company has outstanding transparency on overseas sourcing disclosure 
and monitoring, or has particularly good union relations outside the U.S., or has undertaken labor rights-related 
initiatives that KLD considers outstanding or innovative. In 2002, the Labor Rights Strength was added. 
 
Other Strength (HUM-str-X). The company has undertaken exceptional human rights initiatives, including 
outstanding transparency or disclosure on human rights issues, or has otherwise shown industry leadership on 
human rights issues not covered by other KLD human rights ratings. 
 
Concerns 
South Africa (HUM-con-A). The company faced controversies over its operations in South Africa. KLD assigned 
concerns for this issue from 1991 to 1994. 
 
Northern Ireland (HUM-con-B). The company has operations in Northern Ireland. KLD assigned concerns for this 
issue from 1991 to 1994. 
 
Burma Concern (HUM-con-C). The company has operations or direct investment in, or sourcing from, Burma. 
KLD started assigning concerns for this issue in 1995. 
 
Mexico (HUM-con-D). The company's operations in Mexico have had major recent controversies, especially those 
related to the treatment of employees or degradation of the environment. KLD assigned concerns for this issue 
from 1995 to 2002. 
 
Labor Rights Concern (HUM-con-F). The company's operations have had major recent controversies primarily 
related to labor standards in its supply chain. KLD started assigning concerns for this issue in 1998, and 
subsequently renamed it from International Labor Concern. KLD subsequently created the Labor Rights Concern 
using data from the International Labor Concern. KLD started assigning concerns for this issue in 1998.  
 
Indigenous Peoples Relations Concern (HUM-con-G). The company has been involved in serious controversies 
with indigenous peoples (either in or outside the U.S.) that indicate the company has not respected the sovereignty, 
land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of indigenous peoples. KLD started assigning concerns for 
this issue in 2000.  
 
Other Concern (HUM-con-X). The company’s operations have been the subject of major recent 
human rights controversies not covered by other KLD ratings. 
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Product 
Strengths 
Quality (PRO-str-A). The company has a long-term, well-developed, company-wide quality program, or it has a 
quality program recognized as exceptional in U.S. industry.  
 
R&D/Innovation (PRO-str-B). The company is a leader in its industry for research and development (R&D), 
particularly by bringing notably innovative products to market.  
 
Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged (PRO-str-C). The company has as part of its basic mission the provision 
of products or services for the economically disadvantaged.  
 
Other Strength (PRO-str-X). The company's products have notable social benefits that are highly unusual or unique 
for its industry. 
 
Concerns 
Product Safety (PRO-con-A). The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties, or is involved in 
major recent controversies or regulatory actions, relating to the safety of its products and services.  
 
Marketing/Contracting Concern (PRO-con-D). The company has recently been involved in major marketing or 
contracting controversies, or has paid substantial fines or civil penalties relating to advertising practices, consumer 
fraud, or government contracting. (Formerly: Marketing/Contracting Controversy) 
 
Antitrust (PRO-con-E). The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for antitrust violations 
such as price fixing, collusion, or predatory pricing, or is involved in recent major controversies or regulatory 
actions relating to antitrust allegations. 
Other Concern (PRO-con-X). The company has major controversies with its franchises, is an electric utility with 
nuclear safety problems, defective product issues, or is involved in other product-related controversies not covered 
by other KLD ratings. 
